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How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children 
an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country 
 
As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the 
way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best 
policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level 
(if positive), and uses a combination of need and merit based grants, financed by earmarked 
taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer 
schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these 





The optimal taxation approach adopted in the present paper gives us new insights into how 
best to discourage labour at a very young age, and give all children an effective education, in 
poor developing countries. One such insight is that subsidizing school attendance without 
rewarding school attainment at the same time is not optimal, and may even be 
counterproductive. Another is that, in a second-best perspective, it is optimal to force overt 
child labour below its efficient level, if this is positive, despite the fact that (indeed, precisely 
because) covert child labour cannot be similarly regulated. The analysis lends support to the 
notion that school enrollment should be made compulsory, but not necessarily to the one that 
overt child labour should be banned. These results should be of help, not only in designing a 
universal education system, but also in improving partial forms of public intervention such as 
conditional cash transfers. 
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 1 Introduction
Developing country governments and international development agencies have
long been aware that human, more than physical capital accumulation, is the
mainspring of economic and civil progress. Yet, many children in poor devel-
oping countries fail to complete even the primary education cycle, and some do
not go to school at all. The reasons are well known.1 Baland and Robinson
(2000) demonstrate that child labour will be ine¢ ciently high if parents are
either credit or bequest constrained.2 Evidence that parental inability to bor-
row discourages education, and encourages child labour, is reported by a host
of authors, including Jacoby (1994) and Fuwa et al. (2009). Loury (1981) and
Pouliot (2006) demonstrate that parental inability to insure against the risk of a
low return causes educational investment to be ine¢ ciently low, and child labour
ine¢ ciently high, even if credit is not rationed, and bequests are interior.3 For
evidence that parental inability to insure against the risk of a low return discour-
ages education in developing countries, see Ram and Schultz (1979), and Jacoby
and Skou￿as (1997). Parental incomes also may be uncertain. Evidence in Bee-
gle et al. (2006), that parents respond to a negative income shock by making
their children work more, suggests that households cannot insure against that
kind of risk either. Fitzsimons (2007) reports, however, that parents respond in
this way to a downturn not in their own, but in village aggregate income, sug-
gesting that idiosyncratic income shocks are neutralized by informal insurance
arrangements at the local level.4
As idiosyncratic shocks wash out on average, governments face less risk than
individual households. Partly but not only for this reason, governments have
also easier access to international money markets than most of their citizens. In
the presence of imperfect domestic credit and insurance markets, there is then
an e¢ ciency argument for governments to lend to, and insure, parents of school-
age children in some form. In view of evidence, in Kodde (1986) and elsewhere,
of diminishing absolute risk aversion in an educational context, and given an
unequal distribution of parental wealth, there is also an equity argument. It has
been argued that e¢ ciency-enhancing policies are politically easier to implement
if they do not involve redistribution, but it is di¢ cult to see how they could.
Even if the government could ￿nance the education of poor children entirely by
borrowing against the future tax payments of these children, insuring families
against the risk of a low return to education would still imply redistribution
1For a systematic exposition, see Cigno and Rosati (2005).
2Cigno (1993, 2006) shows, however, that the problem is alleviated if there exists a set
of self-enforcing, renegotiation-proof family rules obliging working-age family members to
support their young children and elderly parents.
3According to Levhari and Weiss (1974), the return to education is uncertain because a
child￿ s learning ability is fully revealed only after the educational investment is carried out.
For evidence of that, see Belzil and Hansen (2002). According to Razin (1976), the uncertainty
concerns the rental price of the human capital accumulated through education. In developing
countries, the uncertainty concerns also the length of time for which the future adult will be
able to enjoy the bene￿t.
4Evidence of such arrangements in a developing country is reported by, among others,
Besley (1995) and Townsend (1994).
2from rich to poor school-leavers. Similarly, insuring families against the risk of
a downturn in parental income would involve redistribution from rich to poor
parents.5 The tension between equity and e¢ ciency will be minimal in the case
of a small-scale project, especially if this is ￿nanced in large part by international
aid,6 but not in the case of a large-scale one. It is also di¢ cult to imagine that
any project, large or small, could be supported by the international community
for ever. Informational asymmetries give rise to another set of problems.
In developing countries, many children work, but much of what they do
is invisible to the government. A small fraction of this covert child labour
involves physically damaging or morally degrading activities. These are the
"worst forms" of child labour national governments are committed by interna-
tional treaty to eradicate. But the great bulk of it consists of activities (like
helping in the home, working in the family farm, contributing to the family
business) conducted for and under the direct supervision of the children￿ s own
parents.7 While comparatively harmless in themselves, these activities con￿ ict
with education, and have thus an opportunity-cost in terms of forgone future
earnings. The government might want to regulate them, but it cannot because
they are private information. There is then a moral hazard problem. Similar
considerations apply if we look at the issue from the educational standpoint.
Every teacher knows that the scholastic performance of a child of any given
learning ability depends not only on how much time the latter spends attending
lessons, but also on how much time she spends on her homework, and how alert
and well rested she is doing both. If a child falls asleep during lessons, and does
not ￿nd the time, or is too tired, to give her homework the necessary attention,
her school results will not be as good as those of a child of the same learning
ability who comes to school well rested, and with her homework conscientiously
done. As school enrollment and school attendance are common knowledge, but
much of what a child does outside school is private information, we have then
another moral hazard problem. A problem of the same nature arises also from
the fact that intra-family transfers are private information, because the govern-
ment cannot then be sure that a public subsidy intended for the children will
not end up as extra consumption for the parents.
The present paper sets out to characterize the second-best policy in the face
of moral hazard, and to compare it with two benchmarks, a low one represented
by laissez faire, and a high one represented by the ￿rst best policy, in a sit-
uation where (a) parents can neither borrow nor insure, and (b) parents are
better informed than the government about their children￿ s time allocation, (c)
the government does not observe intra-household transfers. The analysis rests
on the assumption that the expected return to education is positive.8 A recent
5See Johnson (1987).
6It will not even arise if education is privately ￿nanced by migrant remittances. Dessy and
Rambeloma (2010), Epstein and Kahana (2008), and Hanson and Woodru⁄s (2003), report
evidence that such remittances reduce child labour in the families left behind.
7See Cigno and Rosati (2005).
8For evidence of a causal e⁄ect of education on future earnings, see Card (1999) and
Oreopoulos (2006).
3World Bank survey, Fasih (2008), reports evidence of high returns to education
especially in low and middle-income countries. The same study reports, how-
ever, that these returns are lower for the poor than for the rich. That may be
taken as a sign that the poor can only a⁄ord poor-quality schools,9 but our line
of reasoning suggests another (not necessarily rival) explanation, namely that
children from poor families study less, or less e⁄ectively, per year of school en-
rollment or day of school attendance, than children from rich families do. As the
worst forms of child labour raise moral issues that transcend the materialistic
calculations underlying the present paper,10 we leave them out of the formal
analysis, but will argue that the proposed policy reduces child labour in all its
forms.
The policy optimization has an optimal taxation, or principal-agent, for-
mat.11 This type of analysis does not appear to have been attempted before
in the context of a poor developing country. Given the context, "school age" is
taken to mean primary school age. Assuming that children in that age range are
under parental control, we take their parents, rather than the children them-
selves, to be the agents. The latter are modelled as risk-averse, expected-utility
maximizers.12 As the implications of an educational externality are well un-
derstood, and allowing for it would merely reinforce the argument for public
intervention, the analysis abstracts from it (but we will ￿nd that the policy
itself gives rise to a ￿scal externality). As the argument for having the policy
￿nanced out of general tax revenue is weak in the absence of an education ex-
ternality, and assuming that international aid cannot go on for ever, we impose
the constraint that the policy must be self-￿nancing. Section 2 of the paper lays
down the technical assumptions, and characterizes parental decisions. Section
3 examines the laissez faire equilibrium. Section 4 derives the ￿rst and second
best policies. Section 5 discusses actual policy practice (including conditional
cash transfer schemes) in the light of the theoretical ￿ndings, and concludes.
9On the subject, see Alderman et al. (2001).
10But, see Dessy and Pallage (2005) for a strictly economic analysis.
11For a survey of the ways in which the approach can be used in a family policy context,
see Cigno (2011). For an application in the ￿eld of higher education, see Cigno and Luporini
(2009).
12That is not the only possible representation of individual behaviour in the face of uncer-
tainty. In prospect theory (Kahneman, 2003), individuals are assumed to be risk averse in the
domain of gains, and risk lovers in that of losses. Although this alternative approach has some
empirical justi￿cation, we refrain from going down that road here for two reasons. The ￿rst is
that, in a situation where most people live little above the subsistence level, we are not likely
to observe much risk-loving behaviour. The second is that the policy maker may not approve
of such behaviour, and consequently maximize an objective function which is not a mere ag-
gregation of the individual ones. Kanbur et al. (2008) show that, if the government corrects
for what it considers an aberrant behaviour, the solution to an optimal taxation problem with
moral hazard may have the same properties as if the agents were risk-averse, expected-utility
maximizers.
42 Families
There is a large number of families, labelled i = 1;2:::n. Each family consists
of a couple with a given number of children, the same for every family and
normalized to unity. The assumption that all parents have the same number
of children is less than realistic, but the normative implications of departing
from it have been examined in depth elsewhere,13 and do not impinge on the
points at issue here. Learning ability is randomly distributed across children,
and imperfectly observable by all concerned until the educational investment is
carried out. We take parental income to vary exogenously across families, and
to be observable by the government. Later in the paper, we will allow for this
income to be either uncertain, or private information.
There are two periods, labelled t = 1;2. Children are alive in both, parents
only in the ￿rst one. For brevity, we refer to the child in the ith family as i. Ex
post, i￿ s utility will be
Ui = u(ci1) + u(ci2);
where ci
t denotes i￿ s consumption in period t. Assuming descending altruism,
the ex-post utility of i￿ s parents may be written as
Vi = v(ai) + ￿Ui; 0 < ￿ < 1;
where ai denotes parental consumption, and ￿ is a measure of altruism. The
functions u(:) and v (:) are assumed increasing and concave, with u0 (0) =
v0 (0) = 1. In an uncertain environment, concavity implies risk aversion. The
assumption that marginal utility becomes very large as consumption approaches
zero may be taken to imply that subsistence consumption is normalized to zero.
As utility does not depend on time allocation, we are implicitly saying that
leisure is not a good, and that work does not yield direct disutility. This may
be justi￿ed by saying that, as the worst forms of child labour are out of the
picture, and consumption is likely to be low, the marginal utility of income is
likely to be high relative to that of leisure.
In period 1, a child may or may not be enrolled at school. Enrollment has a
￿xed cost p, equal to the average total cost of tuition.14 In the last section, we
argued that e⁄ective education time is increasing in school attendance, home-
work and rest time, and decreasing in work time. If i is enrolled, her e⁄ective
13If the number of children is exogenous, and parental income or work e⁄ort are private
information, the optimal income tax rate is in fact zero for the family with the highest income.
If it is exogenous, but varies across families as in Cremer et al. (2003), the optimal policy will
redistribute in favour of families with more children. Neither of these properties necessarily
applies, however, if the number of children is endogenous as in Cigno (2001), and Balestrino
et al. (2002), the ￿rst one (no distortion at the top) because the children￿ s visibility makes
mimicking much harder, the second one (children reduce tax liability) because children yield
utility.
14Tuition fees are usually per year (or shorter period like the semester) of school enrollment.
Therefore, the total amount of money a family spends for a child￿ s tuition re￿ects the number
of years for which the child is enrolled at school, but not the number of days for which the
child actually attends school, or the number of hours for which the child studies at home, in
each of those years. We account for this lumpiness of tuition fees by treating p as a constant.
5education time will be positive (or there would be no point in paying p). To sim-
plify, we measure e⁄ective education time as the amount of time that the child
does not work. If i is not enrolled, her e⁄ective education time will be zero.15
Child labour may be overt or covert. The former consists of work done for an
employer other than the child￿ s own parents, and carries a wage. The latter
involves either participating in a family-run, income-generating activity, such
as farming and retailing, or replacing the child￿ s parents in the performance of
household chores such as cooking, cleaning, fetching water and gathering fuel,
etc.16 Although neither of these forms of covert child labour carries a wage,
the former produces income directly, and the latter indirectly by allowing the
child￿ s parents to spend more time raising income. Let ei denote i￿ s e⁄ective
education, and Li her overt labour. Normalizing a child￿ s time endowment to
unity, i￿ s covert child labour is then (1 ￿ ei ￿ Li).
As children can contribute to the production of family income, we de￿ne
parental income in period 1 as family income if child labour in both its forms
were zero. Let yi denote parental income in family i. The income generated by
overt child labour is Liw1, where w1 is the child wage rate. That produced by
covert child labour is z (1 ￿ ei ￿ Li), where z (:) is a revenue function, increasing
and concave, with z (0) = 0 and z0 (0) = 1. By de￿nition of revenue function,
z (1 ￿ ei ￿ Li) is the maximum amount of income that the family can produce
with (1 ￿ ei ￿ Li) units of i￿ s time by optimally allocating this time between
direct participation in income-raising activities conducted by i￿ s parents, and
replacement of i￿ s parents in the performance of household chores. Concavity
re￿ ects diminishing marginal rates of technical substitution between adult and
child work. The assumption that the marginal revenue gets very large as covert
child labour gets very small is realistic in a poverty context like the present
one, and ensures that this kind of labour will never be zero. In period 2, i
will earn w2 + xi, where w2 denotes the income of an unskilled adult, and xi
the individual skill premium. If i does not enroll at school, xi will be zero. In
period 1, i receives a transfer, mi, from his parents,17 and another, ￿i, from the
government. In period 2, i will make the government a transfer ￿i. All these
transfers can be positive, negative or zero.
Parents take their decisions in period 1, after the government has announced
its policy. Anticipating a result that will obtain in Section 4, we take ￿i to be a
function of yi, and ￿i to be a function of xi. While w1, w2 and ￿i are certain, xi
15In many developing countries, a substantial minority of school-age children is reported
as neither working nor studying. But this can be explained, without introducing leisure, by
allowing for the existence of ￿xed costs of access to school and work; see Cigno and Rosati
(2005).
16See Cigno and Rosati (2005) for an analysis of the incidence of these activities, and for
the e⁄ects of making the last two unnecessary by provinding homes with mains electricity,
and running water.
17One might be tempted to simplify the analysis by taking the utility aggregation problem
as solved, and viewing Vi as a family welfare function. This would allow us to leave intra-
family transfers out of the picture, and treat all costs and revenues as pertaining to the family
as a whole, but it would be misleading, because we know from Baland and Robinson (2002)
that transfers from parents to children may be ine¢ ciently low.
6and consequently ￿i are uncertain. As ei must be chosen in period 1, education
is then a risky investment. We make the supplementary assumption (to be
relaxed later in the paper) that xi is i.i.d. over the closed interval [0;x] 2 R+
with density f (:jei) conditional on ei, and f (:j0) = 0. To simplify the notation,
we use xi to measure both the ￿nal school result and the skill premium.18 The
cumulative distribution of xi, F (xijei), associated with a higher ei ￿rst-order
stochastically dominates the one associated with a lower ei,
Fei (xijei) ￿ 0: (1)
In other words, the more i studies, and the less she works, the more of a chance
she has of getting good marks, and thus of attracting a high skill premium.
For each ei, there will be values of xi such that (1) holds as an inequality. We





is convex in ei, and monotone-likelihood-ratio (MLR) assumption, that
fei(:jei)
f(:jei) is increasing in xi,19 which allow us to adopt the ￿rst-order approach.
If i enrolls for school, and overt child labour is not regulated by government,















where vi ￿ v(yi + zi ￿ mi), zi ￿ z (1 ￿ Li ￿ ei), ui1 ￿ u(mi + w1Li + ￿i ￿ p),
ui2 ￿ u(w2 + xi ￿ ￿i) and fi ￿ f (xijei), subject to
ei ￿ 0; (2)
Li ￿ 0 (3)
and
1 ￿ ei ￿ Li ￿ 0: (4)
As (4) will never be binding for the restrictions imposed on the revenue function,







eidxi + ￿i = 0; (5)
￿v0
iz0
i +  i + ￿u0




i1 = 0; (7)
18Using a random variable with density conditional on study time to represent the school
result, and another with density conditional on the school result to represent the skill premium,
would make no di⁄erence of substance to our results so long as both are i.i.d., and the skill
premium is not conditional on some decision variable.
19This property might not hold if xi depended on systemic factors, and (1 ￿ ei) on em-
ployment opportunities. In the present context, however, it seems reasonable to assume that
there is nothing to stop wi falling low enough to clear the (overt) child labour market, and
that there will also be plenty of opportunities for covert child labour.
7where ￿i is the Lagrange-multiplier of (2), and  i that of (3). If i does not
enroll, ei cannot be positive. Again assuming that overt child labour is free to
vary, i￿ s parents will then choose (Li;mi) so as to maximize
V (Li;mi) ￿ v(yi + z (1 ￿ Li) ￿ mi) + ￿ [u(mi + w1Li) + u(w2)];
subject to (3) ￿ (4). The solution will satisfy (6) ￿ (7) for p ￿ ei ￿ 0. If Li
is regulated by the government, (6) need not hold. Irrespective of whether i is
or is not enrolled, and Li is or is not regulated, it is clear from (7) that mi is
decreasing in ￿i. In other words, public transfers crowd out private transfers.
3 Laissez faire




The pay-o⁄ of enrolling i at school is





, s.t. (2) ￿ (4): (8)
That of not enrolling her is
￿W (yi) ￿ max
(Li;mi)
V (Li;mi); s.t. (2) ￿ (4): (9)
The child will be enrolled if and only if ￿S (yi;p) is at least as large as
￿W (yi). There is then a threshold value of yi, e y, de￿ned by
￿S (e y;p) = ￿W(e y);
below which i will not be enrolled. As e y is the same for every i, because the
expected return to education is the same for all of them, if any children are
not enrolled, it will then be those whose parents have a low income. This result
di⁄ers from the one in Ranjan (2001), where a child￿ s learning ability is assumed
to be directly observable ex ante, and the threshold is consequently lower for
parents of high-ability, than for parents of low-ability children.
Given that ￿i will be zero if ei is positive, (5) implies







Therefore, either ei is zero, and i is not enrolled, or ei is positive and increasing
in yi. Taken together with (7), and given that  i will be zero if Li is positive,
(6) similarly implies
either Li = 0 or z0 (1 ￿ Li ￿ ei) = w1: (11)
8Therefore, Li is either zero, or positive and increasing in w1. It is then clear
that overt child labour is the same in all families.20 What di⁄ers is e⁄ective
education and total (overt plus covert) child labour.
Proposition 1. In laissez faire,
(i) children from very poor families are not enrolled at school;
(ii) children from less poor families are enrolled, but their e⁄ective
education increases with parental income;
(iii) overt child labour is either zero, or increasing in the child wage
rate.
The second part of this proposition provides a possible explanation for the
empirical ￿nding, cited in Section 1, that poor children get a smaller increase in
their future income in return for an extra year of school enrollment, or an extra
day of school attendance, than rich children do, because it says that the former
receive less e⁄ective education, in that extra year or day, than the latter do.
4 Government






As parents and children are many, and having assumed that risks are uncorre-
lated, the government does not face any uncertainty about its tax revenue. For
this and other reasons, the government has easier access to international credit
than any of its citizens taken individually. Making the usual "small country"
assumption, we will treat the real interest rate as a constant, and normalize
it to zero. As the expected return to education is the same for every i, and
assuming this to be positive, the government will then make school enrollment
compulsory. As the optimization can determine only relative tax rates, we will
normalize the tax on w2 to zero, and look for the socially optimal values of ￿i
and ￿
i.















and (2) ￿ (4). If
￿
ei;mi￿
is private information, the maximization will be also















, and not also on any
￿
ej;mj;xj;yj￿
for j 6= i.
20It would vary across families if the z () function did (e.g., if the return to covert child
labour were higher in a farming family that owns land, than in one that does not).
94.1 First best
In ￿rst best, the government prescribes (ei;Li;mi), and designs personalized
lump-sum transfers, (￿i;￿i) for each i. As there are no incentive-compatibility
constraints, and denoting by ￿ the Lagrange-multiplier of (13), the ￿rst-order







eidxi + ￿i = 0; (14)
￿u0
i1 ￿ ￿ = 0 (15)
and, for each possible realization of xi,
￿(￿u0
i2 ￿ ￿)fi = 0: (16)
As (11) must still hold, it is clear that the ￿rst-best Li is the same for every
i,
Li = LFB;
and not necessarily zero. The ￿rst-order condition on ei is not the same as in
laissez faire, because it takes account of the expected marginal bene￿t of tax
revenue for society as a whole, ￿
R
xi ￿ifi
eidxi. Given this ￿scal externality, ei
will be larger than in laissez faire for every i.
In view of (7), (15) and (16), it is also clear that
ai = aFB; ci1 = ci2 = cFB and mi = mFB:
As this implies that parental income is equalized across families, and given that
children are ex-ante identical, the ￿rst-best level of ei is the same for every i,
ei = eFB:
Proposition 2. In ￿rst best,
(i) the government uses lump-sum taxes and subsidies to achieve
perfect equity, perfect consumption smoothing, and full insurance;
(ii) all school-age children allocate their time in the same way;
(iii) overt child labour is either zero, or increasing in the child wage
rate;
(iv) each school-age child receives more e⁄ective education than in
laissez faire.
The last part of this proposition implies that the laissez faire level of e⁄ective
education is ine¢ ciently low.
104.2 Second best
In second best, (ei;mi) is private information. According to the logic of optimal
taxation, the government will then make school enrollment compulsory, ￿x Li,
and in￿ uence parental decisions by announcing how ￿i and ￿i will be related to
the information available in the relevant period. As ￿i is payable in period 1, it
can depend only on yi. As ￿i is payable in period 2, it can depend also on xi. If
it seems odd that a benevolent government might actually oblige children to do
a certain amount of paid work, think of the second-best value of Li as a legal
maximum. Because of the potential moral hazard problem, the maximization
of (12) is subject not only to (2) ￿ (4) and (13), but also to the incentive-
compatibility constraints (5) and (7). Let ￿i denote the Lagrange-multiplier of












































i + ￿i [v00
i + ￿u00
i1] = 0; (19)
￿u0
i1 ￿ ￿ + ￿i￿u00
i1 = 0 (20)
and, for each possible realization of xi,
￿(￿u0
i2 ￿ ￿)fi ￿ ￿i￿u0
i2fi
ei = 0: (21)
Using (7), we can re-write (20) as











is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. So long as ri is non-
increasing in i￿ s income,21 and given that v0
i is decreasing in yi, we can then
write
￿i = ￿ (yi); ￿0 < 0: (22)








21See the evidence cited in Section 1, and the discussion in footnote 11.
11As
fei
fi is increasing in xi, and u0
i2 in ￿i, we can then write
￿i = ￿(xi); ￿
0 < 0: (23)
As there is nothing to prevent ￿i from falling below zero for some yi, we can
interpret the former as the di⁄erence between an education grant equal to p,22
and an earmarked tax increasing in parental income. Similarly, as there is
nothing to stop ￿i being negative for some xi, we can interpret the former as
the di⁄erence between another earmarked tax, this time equal to p, and another
education grant, this time increasing in the school result.
Having established that ￿ (:) and ￿(:) are decreasing functions, it is clear
that the policy redistributes from the rich to the poor, and insures parents and
children against the risk of a low return to e⁄ective education. Comparing (20)
with (15), and (21) with (16), however, it is also clear that the policy does
not go as far as in ￿rst best. The reason is, of course, that redistribution has
an e¢ ciency cost, because the government cannot use personalized lump-sum
transfers as in ￿rst best. Let us see what happens to (ei;Li;mi). Comparing (17)
with (14) and (5), we can see that ei is lower than in ￿rst best. In particular, as
(yi + ￿i) is not the same for all i as in ￿rst best, ei increases with yi as (albeit
more slowly than) in laissez faire. As ￿i can be negative, we cannot even rule
out that ei will be lower than in laissez faire for some i. As the government
can borrow against
R
xi ￿ifidxi, however, ￿i will be negative only if yi is very
high. As the government is also insuring parents against the risk of a low return
to e⁄ective education, it is thus unlikely that ei will be lower than in laissez
faire for any i. Comparing (18) with (6), we can also see that Li will be no
higher than in either ￿rst best or laissez faire. The intuition is that, if w1 is
su¢ ciently high for the e¢ cient Li to be positive, imposing a ceiling on overt
child labour will distort the allocation of i￿ s total working time between overt
and covert labour, and thus make work as a whole less attractive in comparison
with education. Comparing (19) with (7), ￿nally, we can see that mi will be
lower than in either ￿rst best or laissez faire.
Proposition 3. In second best,
(i) school enrollment is compulsory, and all school-age children, with
the possible but unlikely exception of those from very rich families,
receive more e⁄ective education than in laissez fare;
(ii) the government uses a net subsidy decreasing in parental income,
and a net tax decreasing in the individual skill premium, to redistrib-
ute and insure, but stops short of perfect equity, full insurance, and
perfect consumption smoothing;
(iii) if the e¢ cient level of overt child labour is positive, the govern-
ment sets a limit, lower than the e¢ cient level, on the amount of
paid work a child can legally do.
22Reecall that subsistence consumption is normalized to zero.
12The implications of relaxing some of the assumptions we have made so far can
be intuited without formal analysis. Suppose that the returns to educational
investments have an aggregate, as well as an idiosyncratic, component. As
aggregate risks cannot be insured against by redistributing within cohorts, the
government must then use its ability to borrow and lend on the international
credit market to redistribute not only within, but also between cohorts. A
similar argument applies to parental incomes. If the shocks to parental income
are purely idiosyncratic, the policy prescription remains qualitatively the same,
because redistributing from rich to poor parents will insure families against the
risk of a downturn in that income. The prescription remains the same also if the
shocks have an area component, because the policy redistributes not only within,
but also between areas. If the shocks have a country-wide component, however,
the government must use its ability to borrow and lend on the international
credit market to redistribute not only within, but also between cohorts (as in the
case where the aggregate shocks concern the return to educational investment).
5 Discussion
In laissez faire, if credit and insurance markets are imperfect, or contracts be-
tween parents and young children are not enforceable, e⁄ective education is
ine¢ ciently low. If parental income is below a certain threshold, the child will
not enroll at school. Above that threshold, the child will enroll, but children
from poor families will receive less e⁄ective education than children from rela-
tively rich ones. This prediction is consistent with evidence in Ram and Schultz
(1979), Jacoby (1994), Jacoby and Skou￿as (1997), Belzil and Hansen (2002),
and Fuwa et al. (2009), that inability to borrow and insure reduces educational
investment. It is consistent also with evidence, surveyed in Fasih (2008), that
the return to measurable educational inputs such as school enrollment or atten-
dance is positive and particularly large in low to middle income countries, but
lower for poor than for rich children. As the amount of e⁄ective education that
a child receives in a year of school enrollment, or day of school attendance, is
lower if she comes from a family with low, than if she comes from one with high,
parental income, the return to enrollment or attendance will in fact understate
the return to e⁄ective education of rich, relative to that of poor children. This
explanation does not con￿ ict with other possible explanations, such as the one
that poor children have only access to poor quality schools.
The optimal (￿rst or second-best) policy relaxes the credit constraint on
educational investment by giving parents an advance on the expected return,
and provides insurance against the risk of a low return by redistributing from
lucky to unlucky school-leavers. By redistributing from rich to poor parents,
it also reduces inequality and, if parental income is uncertain, provides insur-
ance against the risk of a downturn in that income. The ￿rst-best policy uses
personalized lump-sum transfers to achieve perfect equity, full insurance, and
perfect consumption smoothing. As children are ex-ante identical, all parents
enroll their children at school, and give each child the same e¢ cient amount of
13e⁄ective education. The second-best policy also redistributes and insures. As
it cannot use personalized lump-sum transfers, however, it stops short of per-
fect equity, full insurance, and perfect consumption-smoothing. It also raises
e⁄ective education above the laissez faire level for most children, but not to
the e¢ cient level. It is worth noting that, although the worst forms of child
labour are outside the scope of the analysis, a policy that encourages e⁄ective
education will discourage covert child labour in all its forms, including the worst
ones.
In second best, school enrollment is compulsory (that is unnecessary in ￿rst
best, where it is the interest of all parents to send their children to school). If the
child wage rate is su¢ ciently high for the e¢ cient level of overt child labour to be
positive, the government will also impose a legal ceiling, lower than the e¢ cient
level, on this type of labour. By distorting the mix of overt and covert child
labour, this will help to make child labour as a whole less attractive compared
with education. Furthermore, the government makes a transfer decreasing in
parental income to every school child, and exacts a transfer decreasing in the
individual skill premium from every school leaver. The ￿rst transfer may be
negative for school-age children from families with high parental income, the
second for school leavers with a low skill premium. If the expected return to
e⁄ective education is su¢ ciently high, however, the ￿rst transfer is unlikely
to be negative for anyone. We can interpret this transfer as the di⁄erence
between a need-based education grant, covering maintenance and tuition, and
an earmarked tax increasing in parental income. Similarly, we can interpret
the other as the di⁄erence between an earmarked tax, equal to the need-based
education grant, and a merit-based education grant increasing in the school
result. In the model, the ￿rst transfer occurs "at the beginning", and the second
"at the end" of the education process. In practice, the government could deliver
the need-based grant, and collect the tax on parental income, in installments
over the education period. Similarly, it could deliver the merit-based grant in
installments over the education period, as partial results become available, and
collect the tax on school leavers, again in installments, as the individual skill
premia gradually unfold.
As the analysis is tailored for a poor developing country, it may be interest-
ing to compare our results with those of a model tailored for a rich developed
economy. Hanushek et al. (2003) use a calibrated general equilibrium model
to assess the welfare e⁄ects of a range of policy instruments, including need
and merit based education grants, under the assumption that child labour is
out of the question, and that parents are rich enough to be risk neutral (or,
equivalently, that there is a well-developed insurance market). In such a world,
education subsidies in general perform less well than other forms of redistrib-
ution, and a merit-based education grant can be justi￿ed only in the presence
of an education externality (while we ￿nd that it is optimal anyway). These
di⁄erences highlight the importance of the stage of development in the design
of education policy.
Let us now compare our analytical results with actual practice. Primary
school enrollment is compulsory, and work at a very young age forbidden, in
14most countries (but enforcement is not always e⁄ective). In poor developing
ones, and education is subsidized, if at all, only through the price of school
enrollment. Is that better than nothing? We will answer the question in two
steps. First, starting from laissez faire, would compulsory school enrollment
raise social welfare? The answer is no, because it would oblige all parents,
including those who would not let their children study anyway, to bear the
cost of tuition. Forbidding child labour instead or on top of that would also
reduce welfare, because the ban would apply only to overt child labour, and
consequently distort time allocation. Second, given compulsory enrollment, and
with or without a ban on child labour, would a price subsidy raise welfare? If the
subsidy is ￿nanced by a poll tax, the policy will a⁄ect welfare to the extent that
the number of children varies across families. If this number is the same for all
families, the policy will have no e⁄ect, because the parents will take a lump-sum
subsidy with one hand, and give it back with the other. Otherwise, the policy
will a⁄ect welfare, but this e⁄ect will be positive only if the marginal utility of
income is higher in families with many, than in families with few children, or
the ￿scal externality is su¢ ciently large.23 If the subsidy is ￿nanced by a tax
increasing in parental income, the net transfer schedule will look almost like our
￿ (:). Not quite, however, because a price subsidy cannot be larger than the
price, and may thus be insu¢ cient for a second best. In any case, a second best
would require also some form of insurance against the risk of a low return to
e⁄ective education; in other words, we need the ￿(:) schedule too. Finally,
Considerable attention has been given to schemes, like Mexico￿ s PROGRESA,
which e⁄ectively pay children to attend school.24 Skou￿as and Parker (1991)
￿nd evidence that such schemes encourage school attendance and discourage
child labour. If the non observable determinants of e⁄ective education were
positively correlated with the observable ones, we could be con￿dent that o⁄er-
ing transfers conditional on the latter would encourage the former. But there is
evidence that the correlation is actually negative. Ravallion and Woodon (2000)
report that the increase in school attendance elicited by an enrollment subsidy
is four to eight times larger than the corresponding reduction in child labour.
Consistently with this ￿nding, Fuwa et al. (2009) estimate that a credit con-
straint reduces average school attendance by 60 percent, but raises child labour
by double that percentage. Why is that so? The answer given by our model
is that paying a child to attend school triggers a substitution away from, not
only labour, but also homework and rest. This has an e¢ ciency cost, and may
actually reduce e⁄ective education time. The model further tells us that paying
a child to attend school will crowd out parental transfers (parents will give their
children less money, or take more money away from them). In the light of these
theoretical results and empirical ￿ndings, cash transfers should then be made
conditional not only on the child attending school, but also on the child doing
no more than a certain amount (lower than the e¢ cient one, if that is positive)
of overt labour. Furthermore, cash transfers to children in the scheme should
23If fertility is endogenous, the policy could actually reduce welfare, because it will trigger
a substitution of quantity for quality of children; see Cigno (1986).
24For a comprehensive exposition, see Fiszbein et al. (2009).
15be increasing in school results, and decreasing in parental income. Such correc-
tions would improve the scheme, but would not yield a second best, because the
parents would still get no insurance against the risk of a low skill premium, let
alone against the risk of a negative shock to their own income. Of course, the
distance from the second best will be even greater if parental income is private
information, and "overt" child labour is not overt after all, because it will then
be impossible to make cash transfers conditional on either of these variables.
The optimal taxation approach adopted in the present paper has given us
new insights into how best to discourage labour at a very young age, and give all
children an e⁄ective education, in poor developing countries. One such insight
is that subsidizing school attendance without rewarding school attainment at
the same time is not optimal, and may even be counterproductive. Another
is that, in a second-best perspective, it is optimal to force overt child labour
below its e¢ cient level, if this is positive, despite the fact that (indeed, precisely
because) covert child labour cannot be similarly regulated. The analysis lends
support to the notion that school enrollment should be made compulsory, but
not necessarily to the one that overt child labour should be banned. These
results should be of help, not only in designing a universal education system,
but also in improving partial forms of public intervention such as conditional
cash transfers.
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